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Existing technology is capable of yielding secure, reliable, and auditable voting systems.  
This system outlines an architecture based on redundancy at each stage of the ballot 
submission process that is resistant to external hacking and internal insertion of malicious 
code.  The proposed architecture addresses all layers of the system beyond the point 
when a voter commits the ballot.  These steps include the verification of eligibility to 
vote, authentication, and aggregation of the vote.  A redundant electronic audit trail keeps 
track of all of the votes and messages received, rendering a physical paper trail 
unnecessary.  There is no single point of failure in the system, as none of the components 
at a particular layer relies on any of the others; nor is there a single component that 
decides what tally is correct.  Each system arrives at the result on its own.  Programming 
time for implementation is minimal.  The proposed architecture was written in Java in a 
short time.  A second programmer was able to write a module in less than a week. 
Performance and reliability are incrementally improvable by separate programmers 




Computation systems are designed to be the most reliable systems for tabulation.  By 
their very character, they are not subject to the kinds of mechanical failures that plague 
traditional voting equipment.  Despite the advantages electronic systems offer several 
papers and well-known authors [8] have raised fears, uncertainties and doubts as to the 
effectiveness and trustworthiness of electronic voting equipment.  
 
It is possible to create electronic voting systems that, by their very nature, are secure, 
reliable and trustworthy.  An analysis of types of possible attacks, the possible scope of 
these attacks and the likelihood that they will occur is a place to begin.  The architecture 
should address these vulnerabilities. 
 
This paper will demonstrate an approach for using existing technologies in the form of 
computers and their networks to effectively and efficiently handle the voting process.  
Indeed, the proposed approach would solve current problems while improving efficiency.   
 
Specifically this paper will lay out an n-version [12] type of voting system that addresses 
the issues of: 
 
•   Accurate transmission and recording of voter intent, resulting from an 
architecture that performs fault detection and correction. 
 
 
• Prevention of outside tampering or hacking, especially involving the threat of 
changing votes. 
 
• Prevention of malicious internal fraud involving changing or specifically 
developing malicious voting system components. 
 
•  Interception of vote transmission or falsifying the contents of messages between 
system components.  
  
Voting is a complex procedure.  This particular paper will not address the important 
difficulties of registration, local administration of voting, the process of voting itself or 
other important problems.   In subsequent papers we will address the voting process as a 
whole.  It is of note that an increase in voter turnout has coincided with the introduction 
of new electronic voting equipment.   
 
The current and past approaches to voting depended on administrators who assembled 
paper votes by hand to be counted by computers or people.  In all voting to date polling-
place operations and processes have required careful administration and observation to be 
reliable.  The typical approach to security in voting is to have bipartisan human oversight 
of each critical step of an election.  Such human observation can be fairly effective, but a 
combination of the complexity and the scale of the process can lead to errors that result in 




This approach for designing a secure and reliable system relies on an analysis of attacks, 
accidental failures and intentionally malicious code.  While we believe that voting 
systems to date have not been tampered with maliciously, they rely on the same processes 
that other voting systems rely on for security, oversight and care.  Up until now it has not 
been easy for would-be hackers to obtain access to voting systems.  However, it is 
possible to obtain the code illegally in a variety of ways, so this method is insecure 
against the most likely sophisticated hackers.   
 
As the world becomes more reliant on computers in voting systems, it will become more 
important to secure them from new internal and external attacks.  Showing systems to 
work and testing them under many circumstances are important and useful steps.  In 
many cases testing voting systems ahead of time has found problems that could be 
resolved.  Still, in the case of all current voting systems, there is really no way of 
determining if a particular voting system does exactly what the manufacturers claim it 
does.    
  
One concern about the Internet is that electronic transmissions can be held up or slowed 
down for one reason or another.  A system that communicates electronically can batch 
the communication for later transmission, use land telephone lines to communicate the 
information, or use cell phones or satellite phones as alternate communications modes to 
make communication reliable. Secure transmission can be achieved with a variety of 
communication media.   
 
The dangers of power outages have successfully been addressed in Brazil where the 
computer-based voting system relies on batteries that last 14 hours11 .  The question of 
messages being intercepted is one of simple encryption; the issue of changed messages 
would be dealt with using redundancy, cryptography and message authentication codes 
(MACs) to ensure integrity.  Unfortunately, votes recorded on paper have no protocols to 
deal with loss or alteration.  Thus, paper balloting is still vulnerable to interception, 
alteration and deletion.  The architecture for this voting system is designed to 
demonstrate that Internet voting can be safer and more reliable than voting has ever been. 
 
Traditional schemes for making processes robust include following best practices of 
software design and testing:  solid, simple systems that can be analyzed and overseen 
either by being available for anyone to view open-sourced or by being made by experts 
and kept inaccessible. The open-source approach is the opposite of the secrecy approach, 
but, given varying threat models, both have been used as valid and useful methods.   
 
2.1 Threat Model 
 
We assume a variety of attacks are possible, by individuals involved in the production, 
distribution and use of the election systems, as well as by outside hackers.   
 
The Evil Development Company:  The danger of losing contracts due to faulty 
equipment has been a constant concern of election technology companies.  They have 
small close-knit development organizations and review their work together.  These are all 
safeguards for their systems. Still, there is concern that either as an individual or 
organization, the author of a voting system might insert malicious code.  This code could 
change votes, delay or drop votes, or produce intentionally incorrect tallies.  In addition, 
the code could flood the rest of the system with invalid messages, damaging the 
performance of the system.  Included with this type of threat are the distributors of the 
code, as well as the hardware providers. 
 
External Hackers:  To date, external hackers have not had enough time and access to 
voting systems to hack them.  Systems such as Diebold’s, which was found on an open 
FTP server in source code form, fail to hold up to scrutiny [13].  With experience with 
the protocols and enough time-- if a system is communicating over open lines--outside 
hackers could modify, delete and/or record messages between system components.  If the 
system is not over an open network, this threat is of far less concern. 
 
Malicious Voters:  A voter gaining access to the system could try to vote more than 
once, or as another person, or try to steal the votes of other individuals. While to date care 
has been taken to limit access to smart cards or other methods to opening a poll, it is 
possible and important to improve access control to the voting act.  Coercion is always a 
danger; technology can be used to allow or to reduce coercion as well.  
 
  
2.2 Security  
 
Typical methods of implementing voting security focus on:  (1) Isolating the process so 
that no one can see or change a vote; (2) Building in review.  Typical governmental  
applications have relied on isolation and confidentiality as a security approach, labeled by 
some in industry as “security by obscurity.”  The most modern conversations about 
security describe the value in oversight either by expert review, redundancy or open-
source methods .  
 
In the first case, confidentiality as a security approach has worked well.  Potential hackers 
have not had access to the software and have not known what to do when they have 
access to it. Software systems for voting are relatively new.  People attempting to 
compromise security in elections have not been sophisticated hackers yet.  The approach 
of prohibiting access to things that should remain secure has been very successful.  A 
final key point is that voting conditions change with time, many ballots being finalized 
within a day of the election.  The concerns that would alter a specific ballot tend to be 
more local and time dependent than concerns about trying to bring down a country or 
economy. 
 
Certainly secrecy itself is a key method of preventing the wrong people from gaining 
access to sensitive data.  However, secret and closed systems present the serious 
problems of Easter eggs and backdoor approaches. While these problems may seem far-
fetched, they have to be taken seriously, because it is possible that a set of voting 
machines in a particular precinct could be turned into zombies by setting them to a testing 
mode. 
 
Such tampering, of course, would be easily uncovered due to the discrepancy with the 
number of registered voters casting ballots.  However, if, for instance, 4 to 7 officials at a 
balloting place agreed to work together, they could cast ballots after the voters left. 
 
 
While these methods seem to have worked for a long time, there have been breaches of 
security in many elections.  Most have been isolated incidents and have had little impact 
on the national level.  Thus they have merited little national scrutiny.  This changed in 
2002. 
 
However, with the prospect of large-scale, undetectable fraud by using a single system, it 






3.0 Architecture overview:  
  
Designing secure systems requires attention to many levels.  Our approach begins by 
ensuring that there is no single point of failure after the ballot leaves the eyes of the voter.  
The security starts with the general system concept and goes down to specific ways that 
the code is written to avoid introducing reliability problems at any stage.  The key 
advantage of this n-version architecture is that structurally there is no way the whole 
system can be compromised without compromising a very significant number of the 
parts.   
 
The principle of redundancy is central.  It enables the system to continue to work even if 
there is a failure somewhere along the line.  Having multiple programs that process each 
stage of the ballot casting can establish improved reliability; regardless of how they are 
written, regardless of who has written them, and regardless of whether they are the same 
code.  Because these versions can be transmitting over different networks, the system is 
more reliable.  Because these are different programs, subverting one of them would not 
affect the others and still would ultimately enable an accurate vote to be cast.  More 
importantly, if different people and organizations write these modules, intentional 
tampering of one module (discussed as the ‘Evil Equipment developer’), such as putting 
in an Easter egg (a secret module of code that invokes undocumented functionality), 
would not affect the integrity of other modules.   
 
N-versioning on the actual code can only take security so far, while they can avoid 
common flaws amongst the modules, common flaws in the underlying hardware and 
operating system might still compromise the code for all modules.  Thus it is essential to 
place different modules on different pieces of hardware, preferably with small, real time 
operating systems, not large complicated systems such as Windows.    
 
Certainly, to be sure these new measures are effective, the system will have to be tested 
beforehand.  By forcing each module to comply with the abstraction-function behavior 
that we specify, the architecture will be uniformly black-box testable to ensure 
compliance with the protocol.  Clearly, any certification of the system must include a 
thorough formal review of the code.  In addition, there must be no difference between a 
test vote and a real vote, as far as the software is concerned.   
 
In our system we separate the aspect of user interface from the rest of the voting system.  
The intent is to allow user-interface designers to build the best possible user interface for 
every type of user.  A user who is blind might use a different interface than a user who 
has little motor control.  However, we have dealt with a remedy to the possibility of a 
person entering an unintended vote.  In an n-version user interface system could be a 
series of digital cameras would snap digitally signed pictures of the ballot on the screen 
as a way of providing an additional audit trail independent of the rest of the system.  
Alternatively, different device drivers that read the screen could record their observation 
to provide the independent audit trails. 
 
Once the user has filled out the ballot, the next step is to authenticate the voter.  A back-
end system checks the person's name against a database of registered voters.   The 
registration server signs the vote, along with various electronic witnesses which see only 
hashed data.  The “witnesses” sign the vote to indicate that a valid voter as assessed by 
the registration server cast it.  At this point the signed, blinded ballots are then sent to a 
variety of aggregation servers to be counted.   
 
 
4.0 A Demonstration Implementation 
 
The redundancy system involves an n-version modular voting architecture designed for 
implementation in a variety of environments, ranging from a single geographically and 
electronically isolated location to a globally distributed system.   
 
The architecture is composed of four principal layers: A User Interface connection to 
ensure capture of votes, the Registration to assure that the user is valid, the Witnesses 
layer to create an auditable and secure record, and Aggregators to establish an actual 
outcome.  Additionally, feedback layers give the voter proof that the vote was established 
and recorded, as well as another layer between the registration systems and the 
aggregators, known as a mix-network [14], which can perform random secure shuffles of 
ballots to further guarantee anonymity in the final count. 
 
XML is a protocol that is available on all modern computer platforms.  It is human 
readable and allows for definitions of modules by virtually all programmers [4.6]. 
Communication between the components is provided by an XML messaging protocol  
Each level of the architecture logs the incoming and outgoing messages to aid in auditing 
the system. The modules are split up into small modules so that each of them contains 
less than 1000 lines of program code.  This separation will enable a faster and more 
thorough review process, while limiting the number of bugs that can be introduced.  
 
4.1: The User-Interface 
 
Perhaps the most vital component of any voting architecture is the user interface.  This 
architecture allows for the user-interface modules to be developed independently of the 
rest of the architecture.  This flexibility permits faster progress incorporating human 
factors’ research in improving the voting experience.  Other work [5] establishes user-
interface quality assessment.  This architecture recommends that all available effort be 
put into building a user interface that is extremely effective for efficient and accurate 
voting.   
 
The user interface takes two inputs: the interface definition and the blank ballot.  Both of 
these components are XML documents.  The interface definition describes the way in 
which the UI is to render a ballot.   
 
The user interface collects the votes of the user, as well as the registration data.  It then 
encrypts the ballot using keys from the aggregators.  The registration information is 
added to the encrypted ballots, and the resulting packages are then transmitted to the 
registration system.   
 
When the user approves the ballot, there will be an n-version type system of digital 
cameras mounted to the DRE that can take a picture of the ballot, or redundant device 
drivers that observe the actual ballot on the screen and record the contents.  To prevent 
the production of an actual receipt, the picture can only include the ballot itself, and no 
other features, so that either the ballot is showing entirely or the ballot is obfuscated, so a 
user cannot put his or her face in the way, or put a piece of paper saying “Alice Bobster” 
in the way.  Nevertheless, since the digital photograph backup is not used as the primary 
counting mechanism, this problem is of little concern for coercion and vote buying. 
 
4.2:  The Registration System 
 
The registration system is the  center of this voting architecture.   The registration server 
has access to the roster of all registered voters.  When the registration receives a ballot 
package containing registration information and an encrypted ballot, it looks at the 
database, checks to see if the user is valid, and then makes an entry in the database 
checking off the user as having sent a vote to the aggregator.    
 
Each registration module extracts the encrypted ballot, signs it, and then sends it to the 
witness modules (4.3) for their signatures.  Once the witnesses return their signatures, the 
signatures can be appended to the encrypted ballot. Then the whole ballot package 
(without individual identifying information) is shipped off to the aggregators.   
 
4.3:  The Witness Module: 
 
The witnesses are the simplest of the modules.  They take as input an encrypted ballot 
and produce a signature.  Signatures are produced using MD5/RSA. [9] The ballot is 
digested, and a hash is produced, which when combined with the witness’s private key, 
produces a number that, as far as we know, can only be produced by the holder of the 
private key.  Witnesses do not maintain a record of the ballots coming through them, as 
they are meant to be lightweight implementations, preferably using separate databases or 
smart cards so they can be handled easily.  Witness modules are to be provided by 
independent organizations (political parties, watchdog organizations).   
 
4.4: The Aggregator Module: 
 
The aggregator module takes encrypted ballot packages as input.  The packages contain 
the encrypted ballot and a series of signatures produced by the registration system and 
witnesses.  The aggregator parses the signatures and uses the witness public keys to 
verify the signatures.  The aggregator then determines that a set threshold of signatures 
verify and then decrypts the ballot.  Once the ballot is in plain text, the selections are 
parsed and recorded.  Both the encrypted and plain text versions of the ballot will also be 
stored in a repository. 
 
4.5:  Messaging Protocol: 
The messaging protocol is based on XML.  The Document Type Definitions (DTDs) are 
included as Appendix A.  Communication between modules is simple.  The listening 
module waits for connections; the signaling module then initiates a socket connection, 
opens an output stream, then an input stream, and writes a string containing the command 
to the listening module.  The module then does its processing and writes a string of 
commands indicating its response.  The output stream is closed first, and then the input 
stream is closed. 
Standard sockets are used to connect between various components. The prototype 
implementation uses the Java Socket and ServerSocket classes that are conveniently 
provided by JDK 1.4.   
 
5.0 Security and Reliability via Architecture  
The architecture of this system uses modularity and threshold agreement for fault and 
hack tolerance.  Redundant audit trails enforce certain security and reliability.  
Modularity is an important cornerstone of any system that can be scrutinized. Each 
component we have developed is a few hundred lines at the most.  And most of that is 
simply placing the data into a database. The tightness of the software code allows it to be 
quickly and easily certified to do what it is intended to do, for its compliance with the 
protocol that demands plug-and-play interaction with the rest of the architecture, as well 
as code that is easily viewed by outside agencies to determine its accuracy and 
correctness.  Additionally, the separation into interoperable modules creates a voting 
system that could be modified in one aspect without affecting the certification of another 
aspect or component. This modularization dramatically lowers the cost in time and 
money for certification as systems are created and improved.  The most important part of 
modularity, however, is that by separating the modules by steps we can analyze security 
in each stage. 
 
Each module keeps track of the other modules it is supposed to send and receive 
information from, as well as the public keys of those servers.  Modules are defined by a 
contract that indicates what they are to send, receive, and process.  By creating a standard 
contract, anyone can write to the standard and plug a module into the working 
environment. The architecture itself enforces security and reliability while improving 
maintainability. 
 
In the previous stage there are n systems, each of which provide a piece of data.  We 
cryptographically verify the data for each of them, checking their keys and signatures and 
obtain k verified answers.  Using the following rule, we can ensure that most systems are 
behaving: 
 
     For some integer t, where n > t > n/2, consider the result  
     to be valid if k > t.   
This is an implementation of an n-version threshold system, which only accepts 
something as being true if a threshold of "yeas" is achieved. By setting n and t to 
reasonable values (we believe that if each layer has seven components, it will require the 
compromise of four of the units at each layer to compromise the election), a few cheaters 
will never compromise the end result.  But, if there are too many mischievous systems, 
the system will identify the danger of compromised results.   
The thresholding characteristic provides improved reliability and verifiability while 
enforcing security and preventing unscrupulous development companies from writing 
poorly behaving systems.  Still, unscrupulous or careless developers could write some of  
these systems.  By having several different implementations of each module, we guard 
against a few of these systems being compromised from the inside intentionally or from 
outside attackers. 
5.1 Redundancy in Eliminates Need for Voter Verifiable Paper Trail 
Much of the controversy lately has revolved around whether or not to include a voter 
verifiable paper trail.  The simple answer is that there should not be a voter verifiable 
paper trail.  Paper is far easier to lose track of than an audit trail kept on different 
computers.  In the 2000 election, there were many reports of entire precincts worth of 
paper ballots, as well as ballots that were found weeks later in the backs of trucks.  
Adding paper to electronic voting system undermines the public confidence in electronic 
voting systems.  Rather than spending research dollars on attempting to make electronic 
systems more reliable and trustworthy, money is wasted on paper, which has only 
contradictory proof of effectiveness.   
If the failure rate of two systems is independent, then there is very little likelihood of four 
out of seven systems failing.  Of course, we must verify that systems to not contain 
common vulnerabilities and flaws.  To ensure the elimination of common vulnerabilities, 
the source code for each system will be passed through a commonality checker such as 
PLAG or SMAT [18-21].  This system tests for similarities between code, and is 
commonly used to detect cheating in assignments.  In addition to the source code, it is 
prudent to examine the compiler used and in fact, varying the actual compilers used aid in 
preventing the external introduction of common vulnerabilities. 
 
5.2 Cryptographic Security 
A number of cryptographic protocols aid in security. This system uses the following 
cryptographic schemes to achieve improved security and verifiability: 
1. All modules are issued their own private keys.  
2. Modules digitally (RSA) sign all of their transmissions, so that their data transmissions 
are protected against wiretapping or man-in-the-middle attacks.  
3. All transmissions are also maintained with Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), the most 
reliable approach for sending information today, protecting the data itself from being 
read.  
In addition to these fairly standard ways of protecting data, we employ a more specific set 
of schemes for protecting voting data. When sending a ballot to a registration system, the 
architecture must assure that the voter is valid.  The registration system, on the other 
hand, should have no knowledge of how the vote was cast. The filled ballot needs to be 
separated from the access to vote.  Encryption additionally prevents others from seeing 
the voter's vote through the registration system. For governments which keep ballot data 
together (for eliminating walk-around fraud with absentee ballots), the following 
procedure is necessary: take a ballot, encrypt the vote, send the vote along with the 
registration data to the registration server, and have the registration server return the same 
encrypted ballot, but with a signature attached. That signature is known as a blind 
signature.  What is known as the "blinding factor" is an additional layer of encryption that 
the voter can decrypt [10]. This is known as a blind-signature scheme, and it permits the 
system to obtain a signature for a plain text ballot even if the signer does not know the 
plain text. It is analogous to putting a piece of carbon paper in a sealed envelope and 
having someone sign the outside.  The signature will appear on the inner piece of paper. 
Blind signatures allow a system to maintain the privacy and security of the ballots.  
In addition to the registration server signing and validating the ballot, a number of other 
modules must sign the ballot as redundant verification. These are known as witness 
modules, and various watchdog organizations as well as the political parties could 
provide them. They could be smart cards or pieces of software, and they all would 
provide a blind signature to ballots that are considered valid. In that way, when ballots 
are recorded, they are recorded with the signatures of all of these witnesses. The witness 
scheme provides enhanced verifiability and trustworthiness.  
Aggregators simply decrypt and store ballot information. Care must be taken to make 
sure that they properly validate signatures on the ballots and that they are properly 
placing the data into the repositories that they should be in. Having multiple aggregators 
allows us to "recount" on the fly. Aggregators provide redundancy of data and verify the 
entire process up to that point. 
 
5.2 Distributing the responsibility and fallibility 
Voting administrators and voting equipment makers sometimes say,  “We don't care who 
wins as long as it isn't a close race.”  If we are resolved to count each and every vote, this 
is not an appropriate outlook.  (See Voting what was and what could be [1] for 
discussions of how votes get lost.)  Votes obviously have been lost on occasion, 
sometimes several boxes full.  In paper systems, we do not immediately make 5 or 9 or 
11 copies of a ballot to ensure proper handling.  In our electronic system, the 
overwhelming redundancy provides many more ways than paper for checking a vote 
tally. 
From time to time, voting administrators and voting companies get into trouble for 
various violations of election law. Even in 2002, a salesman was indicted for giving 
kickbacks to elections officials. The charges were dropped as he turned in the officials he 
bribed.  
Those who make and operate voting machinery must be somewhat trustworthy.   On 
whom can governmental election agencies depend?  An excellent model can be found in 
Brazil were the trust in elections was reestablished by involving two research institutions 
that helped establish equipment reverence platforms for the voting equipment 
manufacturers.  The choice of equipment was then made in full view of the public by 
voting officials.  In this country this might involve politically separate research 
institutions, such as Caltech, MIT, or Stanford, or governmental research organizations, 
such as NIST, which have no political ties nor are funded by any particular constituency.  
However, we must accept the possibility that some voting systems will be maliciously 
manipulated, and we must guard against that possibility by using our redundant model. 
While the Brazil system eliminates certain potential abuses, the voting system 
architecture outlined in this paper takes the distributed approach to security to another 
level.  Instead of relying on a single company to provide a system in a region, we are 
relying on the distribution of people to avoid fraud.  The architecture becomes more 
secure when more people are involved.  In some cases, too many people involved 
produce sloppy and buggy code, however, by the very architecture involved, this system 
becomes more secure and reliable as additional modules are added.  Even if some of the 
organizations have their own political agenda (and act on it), the architecture will 
maintain the integrity of the system. 
Multiple groups create versions of the same part of the architecture.  It must be easy for 
an election administrator to pick n of these systems, and run them seamlessly.  Thus, 
there should be a common registry of these modules, and an effective means of  
 
6.0 Conclusion 
This voting architecture provides a means to vote over open networks in a way that is 
reliable, secure, and private.  Due to its modularity and common specifications, it is easy 
to implement, improve and it is inexpensive.  The system uses COTS equipment for the 
all of the back end systems, reducing the likelihood of fraud with the system components 
as well as keeping the cost down.  These innovations make it particularly attractive for 
implementation as state budgets are increasingly tightened.   
7.0 Future Work 
N-Verision Programming can be a powerful tool for improving electronic voting security.  
The next steps to creating an N-Version Programming voting system are using it to 
secure the user interface and using it to secure backend vote tabulation and storing.  
Much work remains to be done in the voting architecture field.  Our group is working on 
developing effective user interfaces and improved registration systems.  We are also 
examining ways of providing verifiable feedback to users, but in a way that does not 
compromise the confidentiality and receipt-freeness requirements of voting.  To address 
the need for clear, balanced ballot forms, we are developing an artificial-intelligence 
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